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When they passed the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (the Act), Congress 
restructured and redesigned the Farm Credit System (FCS), and they gave FCS 
owners and management very explicit directions on how to run their business. 
The Act is a far reaching attempt to repair a broken down system, and redesign 
it to minimize the chances of another breakdown. Congress also sent a clear 
signal that if the FCS does break down again, it probably will not be 
repaired. 
The organizers of this symposium asked me to identify problems solved and 
problems created. I added a third category-- problems unresolved. 
Problems Solved 
1. Financial Assistance 
The $4 billion financial assistance package simultaneously addresses a 
number of problems. Cash infusions into financially troubled FCS entities 
will restore solvency and liquidity, guarantee borrower stock, offset some of 
the interest payments on high cost debt, and restore investor confidence. By 
restoring borrower confidence and reducing interest expenses, they should be 
able to slow the exodus of high quality borrowers, and be in a better position 
to compete for new business. The impact of the $90 million assistance package 
on the Louisville FLB illustrates these effects. The value of stock worth 
$3.03 under GAAP was restored to its $5 par value, and average debt cost was 
reduced from 11.1% to 9.7%. However, the availability of financial assistance 
does not guarantee that all FCS institutions will survive. As the Jackson FLB 
experience has demonstrated, the Act gives the FCA the power to close FCS 
institutions when liquidation costs less than financial assistance. 
2. Fewer Nonaccrual Loans. 
Restructuring of distressed loans will convert some nonaccruing loans 
into earning assets which should increase net interest income. In addition, 
loan restructuring negotiated directly by lenders and borrowers should be less 
costly for both parties than Chapter 12 bankruptcies. The long term effects 
of mandatory loan restructuring are uncertain. Restrucutured loans 
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essentially leave those borrowers with 100 percent debt financing, so longterm 
prospects for recovery are questionable. Also, only part of any gains from 
loan restructuring can be attributed to the Act because several troubled banks 
were aggressively restructuring loans and liquidating acquired property long 
before the Act was passed. 
3. Organizational Restructuring 
In 1982, the FCS had enough bricks and mortar 
that was $85 billion, and growing. By 1987 it was 
shrinking. At year-end 1987 there were 37 banks. 
Credit Banks, 4 regional BC's and 1 National BC. 
the assumption that without a merger partner, the 
a neighbor). 
to handle a loan portfolio 
$50 billion, and still 
Now there are 16--11 Farm 
(These numbers are based on 
Jackson FICB will merge with 
The primary benefit from restructuring will be improved service to 
borrowers and better credit evaluations from packaging long and short term 
loans. The cost savings from bank mergers will be small because all 36 
FLB/FICB/BC regional banks were operated as 12 jointly managed units before 
the Act was passed; hence, potential overhead reductions from mergers had 
already been largely realized. In fact, it could be argued that the Act 
increased the number of FCS banks from 13 to 16! Reducing the number of 
entities will not result in a proportionate reduction in staff, and any cost 
savings may well be offset by increases in travel and communication expenses. 
4. Regulatory Authority 
The 1987 Act reaffirmed the regulatory powers of the FCA provided in the 
1985 Farm Credit Amendments Act. The extent to which the FCS's problems can 
be attributed to inadequate supervision is debatable; however the FCA should 
now be able to enforce timely corrective action when necessary. The surprise 
closing of the Jackson FLB indicates that the FCA does have the will to make 
difficult decisions. 
Problems Created 
There are several provisions of the Act that will increase FCS lending 
costs and give competitors greater lending authority. 
1. Borrower's Rights 
Restructuring, reviews, appeals, right of first refusal, federal funding 
of mediation, etc. have significantly reduced FCS's flexibility in managing 
delinquent loans and acquired property. In addition to their immediate 
impacts on existing distressed loans, the borrowers rights provisions convey 
implicit messages to all present and future borrowers: good borrowers are 
subsidizing delinquent ones and the consequences of defaulting on a FCS loan 
are not particularly serious. Thus, FCS lenders will also experience higher 
loan screening costs because there are clear incentives for weak borrowers to 
go to FCS and for good ones to go elsewhere. It appears that Congress 
overreacted to a few legitimate cases of unfair treatment of FCS borrowers, 
and in doing so they may have created another FmHA. 
2. Increased Lending Costs 
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Despite efforts to streamline the FCS, most provisions of the Act will 
adversely affect their lending costs well into the 21st century. The $4 
billion assistance package and RAP accounting may solve immediate problems; 
however, the Act stipulates that the FCS must eventually repay all government 
aid, with interest. In addition, there will be insurance fees of .0015 
(.0025) X accruing (nonaccruing) loans. The new capitalization methods and 
higher capital requirements will also have to be passed on to borrowers in the 
form of loan origination fees and/or higher interest rates. 
In the short run, organizational restructuring will be disruptive and 
costly. Fewer offices will require new credit delivery systems. An expanded 
FCA and new entities such as the Financial Assistance and Insurance 
Corporations will increase overhead that may have to be spread over a 
declining volume of loans. Some of these added costs will be offset by lower 
funding costs resulting from restored investor confidence. 
Precise estimates of these cost increases cannot be predicted. Barry's 
analysis suggests that repaying $4 billion over 10 years will add 130 basis 
points to lending cost. When other costs and RAP deferred expenses are 
included, the total effect may well be 200 basis points. Reduced funding 
costs may reduce the net effect to 150 basis points. Overall, the loan 
pricing advantage that the FCS historically enjoyed has likely been 
eliminated. 
3. More Competition in Real Estate Lending 
If the secondary market authorized by the Act does evolve, the FCS will 
continue to lose market share in real estate lending. It is not clear whether 
the FCS should participate in a secondary market or compete with it. They may 
be forced to use it to avoid the high costs of capital requirements and 
borrower rights on loans held in their own portfolios. 
Prospects for a viable secondary market appear questionable. Origination 
and pooling fees, payments into reserve funds and compliance with eligibility 
standards will be expensive, especially in the early stages. The long list of 
restrictions on eligibility for inclusion in a pool will also make it 
difficult to process loan applications in a timely manner. It may be nearly 
impossible to find a pool of loans that fulfill all of the parameters on loan 
size, geographic and commodity diversity, etc. The size of the market may be 
the biggest constraint. Prentice estimates that $500 million to $2 billion of 
farm mortgages will go into the secondary market each year. With nearly $300 
billion in residential mortgages to choose from each year, it will be 
difficult to generate much investor enthusiasm for Farmer Mac offerings. 
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Problems Not Resolved 
1. Single Sector Lending Authority 
The Act does nothing to allow or encourage the FCS to diversify beyond 
lending to farmers, farmer owned cooperatives, and rural home buyers. 
Splitting off the BC's from the Farm Credit Banks may have worsened the 
specialization problem. 
2. Lack of Coordination/Cooperation 
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A spirit of cooperation within FCS has been noticeably absent throughout 
their traumatic years as evidenced by their tendency to sue each other instead 
of sharing losses. Although the Act suspended Capital Preservation 
Agreements, it does nothing to encourage or force system entities to come 
together when the need arises. As an example, $12.3 million of the $16.4 
million FAC assessment on Fourth District PCA's was paid by the five small 
associations that stayed outside of the district-wide merger in 1986, and they 
are going to court to try to get their money back. 
3. Management Issues 
The Act does little to address management problems that contributed to 
the FCS's problems. As Klinefelter notes, not all troubled FCS entities were 
poorly managed, and some FCS management problems are common in all lending 
institutions. My own assessment is that FCS owners have been reluctant to pay 
what it takes to attract the calibre of people needed to effectively manage a 
large, complex financial institution. The FCS can no longer hide its 
management shortcomings behind the veil of low cost agency market funding. 
Unfortunately, increased bureaucratic overhead and reduced managerial 
flexibility resulting from the Act will make it even more difficult to attract 
qualified management in the future. 
